Contents

Glossary

THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972
by Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong

CHAPTER I

Introduction

From Insurgency to Conventional warfare

Map1: The NVA General Offensive of 1972

On 30 March, 1972, following heavy artillery preparations, three North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions spearheaded by tanks crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into South Vietnam. From the north and the west, they attacked and overran the thinly defended forward outposts and fire support bases held by the 3d Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN). Three days later, further south in Military Region 3, three other NVA divisions closed in on An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon, after taking a district town near the Cambodian border. Then, on 14 April, two NVA divisions attacked troops of the 22d ARVN Infantry Division who manned the defenses of northwestern Kontum in Military Region 2 while directly to the east, in the lowlands of Binh Dinh Province, another NVA division struck at the province's three northern district towns. (Map 1)

And so, within two weeks beginning on Easter day, large conventional battles were fought simultaneously on three major fronts that pitted a total of ten NVA divisions against an equivalent number of ARVN forces. For the first time, almost the entire armored force of North Vietnam was thrown into the battles along with a significant increase in heavy artillery support. This was the largest offensive ever launched by the Communists against the Republic of Vietnam since the beginning of the war and because of enemy timing, it was quickly called the Easter invasion. Judging from the size of forces committed and the tactics employed, this offensive represented a radical departure from the methods of warfare the Communists had historically used in their attempt to conquer the South.

Prior to 1960, Viet Cong activities consisted primarily of small unit attacks designed to undermine the GVN1s efforts of nation building. They were essentially hit-and-run terrorist actions, assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage. During 1960, the first battalion level attacks materialized. Then these attacks increased in tempo and reached multi-battalion Proportions during 1961. To counter this expanding threat of insurgency, the government of Vietnam (GVN) activated additional regular units, increased the auxiliary forces (later to be called Regional and Popular or Territorial Forces), and initiated pacification efforts. At the same time, the United States also increased its military assistance to South Vietnam in terms of advisers and combat support. These concerted U.S.-RVN efforts appeared at that time to have been successful in slowing down the Communist military momentum by the end of 1962.

The political events in 1963 and the ensuing turmoil during 1964, however, seriously impeded RVN military efforts and security deteriorated rapidly. In the country side, increasing numbers of strategic hamlets were penetrated and overrun by the Viet Cong. Friendly losses in weapons increased at an alarming rate and several territorial force units in remote areas just vanished in the face of enemy pressure.

By late 1964, Viet Cong battalions had been grouped into regiments and regiments into divisions. Several large scale battles were fought during this year; the most notable was the attack conducted by the VC 9th Division against the Catholic village of Binh Gia, east of Saigon, at year 5 end. During this battle, the enemy ambushed and annihilated an ARVN ranger battalion and a marine battalion. He also inflicted severe losses to an ARVN armored force which came to their relief. This was the first time enemy forces had ever remained on the battleground in sustained combat for several days. To both sides, it was an event of significant importance. The Communists considered this effort the first step toward the so called "mobile" or final stage of their revolutionary warfare. To South Vietnam, it was the beginning of a military challenge that would be long and difficult.

In early 1965, North Vietnamese regular units began to operate in South Vietnam. The first infantry regiment to arrive, the NVA 95th, had closed into Kontum Province by the end of December the previous year. It was followed and joined by two other units, the NVA 32d and 101st Regiments, which arrived during the first two months of 1965. The enemy1 5 objective at that time appeared to be to cut South Vietnam into two isolated halves along National Route 19 and then expand this offensive toward the completion of what he considered the decisive and possibly terminal phase of the war.

By mid 1965, ARVN forces were suffering losses which statistically amounted to an average of one battalion and one district town per week. The military situation was deteriorating at such an alarming rate, the United States deemed it necessary to commit its combat troops to fight the ground war to forestall the collapse of South Vietnam. Soon to be followed by combat units of other Free World countries, U.S. forces began' to conduct search and destroy operations in August 1965. Still, the ARVN suffered another major setback at the hands of the same 9th VC Division when it reappeared at the end of the year and badly mangled the 7th ARVN Infantry Regiment in the Michelin rubber plantation north of Saigon.

As a result of the arrival and direct participation of U.S. and Free World military forces, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) gradually regained balance. During the years 1966 and 1967, both U.S. and RVNAF units increased and expanded their offensive operations. These operations were designed primarily to destroy the enemy's bases and strongholds, clear the populated areas from his encroachment, and create a favorable setting for pacification and development. War Zones C and D, the enemy1s thus far impenetrable strongholds north of Saigon and his other base areas west of Pleiku, Kontum and north of Quang Tn became targets for repeated attacks by U.S. and RVNAF units.

During this period, Communist forces operating in South Vietnam not only lost their initiative but were driven, unit by unit, away from populated centers and major areas of contest. Gradually, local Viet

Cong guerrillas became separated from their protectors, the main force units, and mutual support between these two elements was no longer as effective as it had been. As a result, the enemy's strategic posture was weakened considerably.

During 1967, the enemy endeavored to continue some of his initiatives in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in other remote areas along the national borders. But deep inside South Vietnam, there were absolutely no significant enemy activities or accomplishments. To redress this deteriorating posture, it was obvious that a major shift in effort would be required. North Vietnam leaders came to the conclusion that only a major, decisive offensive could help him turn the tide around.

Toward the end of 1967, intelligence reports began to indicate that there were significant infiltration of men and materiels and large troop movements down the Ho Chi Minh trail system and along enemy lines of communication inside South Vietnam. This information was coolly received by RVNNF authorities, more as a routine matter than a cause for alarm. Cautious measures were duly taken in the same old pattern of years past, focusing on remote areas and the countryside rather than on the cities and urban centers. As usual and routinely, a declared truce was planned during the Tet holidays commemorating the Vietnamese lunar calendar New Year.

Suddenly, the Communists initiated a general offensive, striking at almost all major cities and urban centers across the country. This occurred while the majority of Vietnamese, civilian and military alike, were celebrating the Tet amidst the deceptive quietness of the truce. From the very beginning of this offensive the enemy committed an attacking force of such proportions as never before encountered during the entire war, estimated at 84,000 troops including local forces. Attacks by fire, ground assaults, and sapper actions were repeatedly launched against 36 of the 44 provincial capitals, 5 of the 6 major cities and 64 of 242 district towns of the RVN. This was the first time that our South Vietnamese urban population had ever experienced the hazards of real war. Although taken by surprise, the RVNAF reacted swiftly and forcefully. With the support of US and Free World forces,

they effectively drove off the enemy's attacks and rapidly regained control over most contested areas, with the exception of Hue, the ancient capital, and part of Saigon where it took longer to dislodge enemy troops.

In Saigon, despite their ability to penetrate the city without being detected and the fact that the defenders were caught unaware by their attacks, Communist forces were unable to occupy any key installation very long. But they clung stubbornly to the densely populous areas of Cho Lon. It took our cautious soldiers and the police forces nearly two weeks to clear the last enemy troops from the city.

At Hue after penetrating the city, Communist forces succeeded in occupying mo8t of it, particularly the old citadel, and lay siege to several military installations. During that time, they murdered more than 3,000 defenseless servicemen and GVN civil servants and cadres stranded in the city. This 26-day battle for the control of Hue resulted in extensive destruction within the city and left 110,000 of its inhabitants homeless.

While battles were raging fiercely in cities and towns across the country, on 7 February 1968, the enemy launched determined attacks in the highland area around Khe Sanh Base near the borders of Laos and North Vietnam. This base including its airstrip, was defended by a reinforced U.S. marine regiment and an ARVN ranger battalion. Despite the enemy's repeated assaults and continuous attacks-by- fire, Khe Sanh Base held firm under siege. North Vietnam's apparent design to stage and repeat a Dien Bien Phu type victory was soundly defeated by the overwhelming firepower of US forces.

The first phase of the enemy's general offensive of 1968 thus ended in dismal failure. The price he paid for it was excruciatingly high. Not only had he lost over 50,000 men he had also sacrificed the elite troops of his local force in suicidal attacks. However, by bringing war into the big cities, the enemy had wrought havoc and created a resounding shock. His action also drew RVNAF and Allied forces away from the rural areas for the protection of urban centers. To deepen the psychological impact, particularly on the United States, the enemy continued his offensive campaign of 1968 with

two additional phases of attack, one starting in early May and another about the middle of August. But with his forces reduced and his stamina lost, these initiatives generally ran their course until completely defeated.

After their military defeat during 1968, Communist forces in South Vietnam went through a period of decline. Despite attempts at resurgence which materialized with a country wide offensive on 23 February 1969 and during the following two years under the form of seasonal "high point" activities, they never recovered enough to engage in large scale and sustained attacks. As a result of his local force units being severely decimated during 1968, the enemy also had difficulties re-establishing his system of communication and mutual support between border base areas and feeder zones adjacent to urban centers. Therefore, NVA main force units in the South were virtually cut off from their usual source of supply and local guides, which were considered indispensable for effective operations.

The big challenge having been overcome, the RVNAF became more self assured. With the strong support provided by United States and Free World Military Assistance forces, the RVNAF stepped up their operational efforts during 1969. The resulting achievements in pacification were never so good. Not only were the enemy's safe havens along the border continually under attack, his base areas inside South Vietnam, both those straddling infiltration routes and others adjacent to populous centers were also effectively "cleared and held." In August, 1969, as a result of a new policy U.S. and FWMA forces began to withdraw from South Vietnam. To help the RVNAF develop their self contained capabilities for combat operations and pacification support, the United States undertook an accelerated program of improvement and modernization which was called Vietnamization.

All of these developments edged the Communists toward relying more on conventional methods of warfare, a radical departure from the kind of attrition warfare they had fought during the years prior to 1968. During 1970, after greatly reinforcing his forces in the South, the enemy made plans for large scale attacks. But these plans were preempted

by the Cambodian incursion during which U.S. and ARVN forces systematically destroyed almost all Communist supply bases, heretofore considered inviolable, along the border. Despite limitations imposed on it in terms of time and space, the Cambodian incursion effectively removed the threat of sustained attacks below the 12th parallel inside South Vietnam at least for one year.

Following up on their successful exploits in Cambodia, in February 1971, the RVNAF launched a large scale but limited offensive into lower Laos with substantial support in firepower, airlift and logistics provided by the United States. Code named LAM SON 719, this operation was designed to interdict the enemy's north-south infiltration routes and to destroy his supply bases in the Tchepone area, a vital communication hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail system. ARVN forces committed in the operation were all elite, combat proven units of the RVNAF - the 1st Infantry, the Airborne, and the Marine Divisions. But they could not achieve all of the objectives contemplated, partly due to the forceful reactions of the enemy who for the first time employed tanks and heavy artillery in battles with success, and partly due to some tactical blunders on our part.

This experience seemed to reinforce the enemy's belief that with his modern weapons, he coul4 defeat South Vietnam's armed forces, and consequently, the war could be ended by a military victory once U.S. troops had been withdrawn. Further, he believed that military victory could only be achieved by a conventional invasion.

To prepare for his invasion, North Vietnam requested and received huge quantities of modern weapons from Russia and Red China during 1971. These included MIG-21 jets, SAM anti-air missiles, T-54 medium tanks, 130-mm guns, 160-mm mortars, 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, and for the first time, the heat-seeking, shoulder fired SA-7 missiles. In addition, other war supplies such as spare parts, ammunition, vehicles and fuels were shipped to North Vietnam in such amounts as never before reported during the previous years of the war.

Despite this growing military threat, the United States and other Free World allied countries maintained their disengagement policy and

continued withdrawing their troops from South Vietnam at an accelerated rate. In the process, combat support assets provided by the United States for the RVNAF were also substantially reduced. As the American military presence diminished, the threat from North Vietnam became more serious. And at the beginning of 1972, it was obvious that a decisive NVA general offensive which had been in the making for some time would surely occur.

General Character of the Easter Offensive

It was not by simple coincidence that Hanoi selected the code name Nguyen Hue for its Easter invasion of 1972. Nguyen Hue was the birth name of Emperor Ouang Trung, a Vietnamese national hero who in the year of the Rooster (1789) maneuvered his troops hundreds of miles through jungles and mountains from Central to North Vietnam, surprised and attacked the invading Chinese in the early days of spring and dealt them a resounding defeat in the outskirts of Hanoi.

In early 1972, Hanoi apparently wanted a repeat of this historic exploit in the other direction. But Hanoi failed to achieve the surprise that constituted the decisive advantage enjoyed by Nguyen Hue. By the end of 1971, evidences of North Vietnam's preparations for the invasion of the South had appeared from a number of sources. Notably, divisions of the NVA general reserve were moving south and a "logistics offensive" was underway in the Southern region of North Vietnam. In early December, the Joint General Staff began sending warnings to military region commanders advising them to be prepared for a major enemy attack during early 1972.

The most difficult part of the estimate concerning the enemy's obvious intention to attack was the timing. In an early warning, ARVN intelligence revealed that the enemy had the capability for a major offensive and forecast that he would probably initiate the attack sometime before the Tet or in late January. Nothing happened. Subsequently, a second estimate, based upon evidence of increased preparations in the B-3 Front, foresaw the possibility of attacks during the Tet

holidays (mid-February). This warning caused the ARVN to order that troops remain in their barracks during this long holiday period; the memory of Tet 1968 was still fresh in every body's mind. On the eve of Tet, a late decision was made to release part of the troops on the traditional three and a half days' Tet leave and the holidays passed quietly without any significant enemy initiated activities.

Although there was general agreement in the intelligence community - Vietnamese as well as American - that an offensive in early 1972 was highly probable, some observers of the Vietnam scene, perhaps those not as well informed as those of us privy to the most reliable estimates, were influenced more by what seemed to them to be the illogic of a major North Vietnamese attack at this time. They reasoned that to ensure victory, North Vietnam would wait until 1973 when most, if not all, U.S. forces would have been withdrawn according to plans. It would be impossible then for the United States to reintroduce troops and the chances of U.S. intervention by air would also diminish.

To Hanoi, however, 1972 was apparently just as good an opportunity since by the end of January, U.S. combat strength in South Vietnam would have been reduced to 140,000 and should reach below 70,000 by the end of April. By that time, the remainder of U.S. forces would consist merely of three combat battalions and some tactical aircraft and helicopters, a combat force no longer considered significant. In a certain sense, this residual force would make 1972 look even more attractive in Hanoi's eyes because if it could achieve a military victory, the U.S. would certainly have to share in South Vietnam's defeat. Moreover, if the Vietnamization program and RVN pacification efforts were permitted to continue successfully and without interruption throughout the year, the military conquest of South Vietnam might well be much more difficult. To Hanoi, therefore, 1972 was the year for action.

With regard to timing, North Vietnam's genuine problem was probably to launch the invasion at such a time as to be neither too far ahead of the U.S. presidential elections in November 50 as to enhance its political impact nor too late into the dry season when torrential rains by late May could seriously impede movements on infiltration routes

along the border. It was logical that Hanoi would want to be sure that when the fighting required large troop movements and resupplies, it would not be caught short. But if the invasion was to take place too early in the dry season and did not succeed, it would also be difficult and costly for North Vietnam to sustain its offensive drive through the rainy season. In any event, Hanoi's ultimate goal was to ensure a military victory. It did not make sense in this case to delay action any longer once preparations had been made. For one thing, a long delay would be costly logistically and morale sapping when thousands of combat troops lay idle. For another, the assembled units might well become targets for heavy strikes by the U.S. Air Force. It then became obvious that late March or early April was the best time to initiate attacks.

But where would these attacks take place and what objectives did the enemy have in mind in 1972? To veteran military intelligence officers, these questions were not very difficult to answer. Again, based on past activity patterns and geopolitical goals of the enemy they would predict that his actions would probably occur in areas where NVA main force units and their supplies were concentrated such as in the DMZ, the Tri-Border area, or in those areas adjacent to such well established base areas as War Zones C and D, Dong Thap (Plain of Reeds), and U Minh. More precisely, current intelligence on the disposition and deployment of NVA main force units at the time allowed us to estimate that in MR-l, there would be a two pronged attack, one to be conducted by the NVA 304th and 308th Divisions from the direction of Khe Sanh against Qnang Tri, and the other, an eastward effort by the NVA 324B Division from the Laotian border against Hue. The enemy's apparent objectives were to occupy Hue, the ancient capital, and threaten the harbor and airport of Da Nang, 60 miles to the south.

The second enemy effort would be directed against the highlands of MR-2 with Kontum as a primary target. This attack was to be conducted by two NVA divisions, the 2d and 320th. Farther to the south, in MR-3, it was possible that, in concert with the total effort, the three enemy divisions in that area, the 5th, 7th, and 9th, would launch attacks

north of Saigon against provinces adjoining the Cambodian border such as Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long. Two other NVA divisions, the 3d "Gold Star" in the mountainous redoubt of northern Binh Dinh Province, and the 1st, in the Cambodian border area west of the Mekong River, and other elements in the U Minh forest area might also join in the offensive with local attacks.

Although the three areas of the enemy's major concentrations -- northern MR-1, Kontum, and north of Saigon - were clear indicators that the heaviest attacks would occur in these regions, it was impossible, on the basis of available intelligence, to determine the priority the enemy assigned to the three objective areas. Neither could we tell which attack would be launched first, or if they would occur simultaneously.

The real issue, as far as the RVN was concerned, however, was not so much the enemy 5 choice of primary effort or his timing as the proportions of his offensive. It was fairly easy to predict that the invasion would dwarf all other previous attempts in scale; it was also possible to predict with reasonable accuracy how much combat force the enemy was going to commit in this invasion initially -- which in all probability would consist of at least 10 divisions and supporting elements or a total of about 130,000 troops. But no one was able to conclude at that time exactly how much reinforcement these initial forces would eventually receive in the next stage and ultimately what size the NVA total commitment would be. Obviously, it was also equally impossible to tell how long the offensive would last and finally, how much sacrifice the enemy would be prepared to accept to ensure his victory. These were the questions left unanswered until after NVA troops crossed the DMZ on 30 March1 1972.

The enemy's Nguyen Hue campaign finally materialized under the form of an unprecedented, conventional invasion with three large spear heads or efforts. The first effort was conducted across the DMZ in northern Quang Tri Province; it was combined with another effort driven eastward in the direction of Hue City. The second effort, initiated a few days later, struck into Binh Long Province in northern MR-3 from the Cambodian border. The third effort, which was conducted after

initial successes in Quang Tri and Binh Long, was directed against Kontum Province in northern MR-2 at the same time as attacks in Binh Dinh Province in the coastal lowlands. The Mekong Delta, meanwhile, remained unusually quiet despite a significant increase in enemy activities, especially in some areas adjacent to the Cambodian border and in Chuong Thien Province which bordered on the U Minh forest. The enemy's effort in MR-4, however, was neither as concentrated nor as sustained as in the other military regions.

North Vietnam, as it turned out, was committing its entire combat force --14 divisions, 26 separate regiments, and supporting armor and artillery units -- into the battles, except the 316th Division which was operating in Laos. The fierceness of this all out invasion turned parts of South Vietnam into a blazing inferno. The enemy's classic frontal assaults which spearheaded these battles proved tremendously effective, at least during the initial stage. Our strong points just south of the DMZ, a responsibility of the ARVN 3d Infantry Division, were unable to hold more than three days under repeated artillery barrages and vigorous attacks by enemy armor and infantry forces. After a month of resisting, our 3d Division and the defending forces of northern MR-i disintegrated; Quang Tri city fell into enemy hands. Areas north of Binh Long and west of Kontum were also under his control and the cities of An Loc and Kontum were under heavy attack.

It was only three months after the outbreak of the invasion that ARVN forces regained their poise supported by powerful and effective U.S. tactical air and naval gunfire, and began the counteroffensive.

The ARVN counteroffensive was fairly effective. Not only did it completely stall the NVA invasion on all major fronts, it also succeeded in recovering part of the lost territory, including the provincial capital of Quang Tn, the first ever to fall into enemy hands. This feat alone, notwithstanding the heroic siege of An Loc and the unyielding defense of Kontum, eloquently testified to the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and offered proof of the success of the Vietnamization program. The biggest challenge had been met, our combat maturity had been proven, and the South Vietnamese people's

self assurance was growing. This occurred at a time when the Paris peace talks were entering the final stage. Never before had the RVN strategic posture been so good, its bargaining position so strong and its prospects of national survival so promising.

The battles fought during the blazing red summer of 1972 marked a turning point in the Vietnam war. For the first time, Communist North Vietnam realized it had no chance of a military victory while the U.S. still provided the South with air support and adequate logistics. It was finally compelled to accept a cease fire.

The battles of the Easter offensive, the gains and setbacks, and the strengths and weaknesses of both sides will be presented and critically analyzed in the following chapters.