Contents

Glossary

THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972
by Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong

CHAPTER VII

A Critical Analysis

North Vietnam's Objectives, Strategy, and Tactics

Since their major defeats during 1968 and 1969, the Communist leaders in Hanoi had the urgent requirement to accomplish two things. First, they needed to improve their deteriorating strategic posture in South Vietnam, and second, to have an ultimate chance to win, they had to defeat the vietnamization process. Politically, as Viet Cong negotiators later disclosed in Paris, North Vietnam's leaders also strongly believed they needed a leverage to strengthen their demand for a coalition government in the South. To obtain this leverage, it was mandatory that they control through military action as much territory of the Republic of Vietnam as possible. This was the rationale behind North Vietnam's decision, made in mid 1971, to conduct the 1972 invasion.

Hanoi's campaign plans for 1972 reflected a change in strategy. To hasten and force a solution to the war of their own choice on the United States and South Vietnam, its leaders were prepared to short circuit the evolutionary phases of a protracted war of liberation and take the calculated risks of a decisive, all out offensive.

One of the most revealing indications of North Vietnam's new strategic approach appeared in an unnumbered resolution adopted by its Central Office for South Vietnam in December 1971. In its own conceptual words, this resolution called for "tilting the balance of forces through the use of main force warfare and political initiative." In more down to earth terms, it advocated defeating vietnamization and pacification, expanding the territory under Viet Cong control, and protecting base areas and lines of communication in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

Additional revelations of the enemy1s objectives were also obtained throughout the last six months of 1971 from captured documents and agent reports. Finally, these objectives were found summarized in COSVN Directive No. 43, dated March 1972. Basically, this directive reiterated and elaborated on the major objectives already outlined in the unnumbered resolution of December 1971. But it also disclosed other objectives that COSVN was concurrently contemplating, namely, disrupting the RVN economy, improving the morale of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), influencing American and world opinion, and discrediting and overthrowing the Thieu administration.

North Vietnam's principal goal for 1972, inferred from these objectives, seemed to be a standstill cease-fire as soon as it had achieved some territorial gains. From this improved bargaining position, our enemy felt certain he could force negotiators into accepting a solution to the war that would be most favorable for his side.

The Nguyen Hue campaign failed to accomplish intended objectives. In exchange for some insignificant territorial gains, North Vietnam had virtually exhausted its manpower and materiel resources. Estimates placed its losses at over 100,000 casualties and at least one half of its large caliber artillery and tanks. By the end of 1972, it became obvious that Hanoi no longer possessed the capabilities for another general offensive in South Vietnam in the immediate future. At the price of this huge sacrifice, the gains that North Vietnam had achieved looked insignificant indeed. Not one of the 44 provincial capitals of South Vietnam - with the exception of the temporary occupation of Quang Tri - ever fell into enemy hands. Out of the 260 district towns, fewer than ten were occupied, almost all of them located in remote border areas, far removed from centers of population. What then caused North Vietnam's failure to attain its military and political objectives?

It was obvious that when planning the Easter invasion, North Vietnam's leaders had grossly underestimated two things: first, the RVNAF capability for sustained combat and capacity for endurance, especially as far as the territorial forces were concerned; and second, the extent and effectiveness of U.S. airpower. In addition, their illfated

offensive was conducted with several apparent strategic and tactical miscalculations.

In the first place, Hanoi made a basic strategic error when it dispersed its main force units and made major efforts on three widely separated fronts instead of concentrating them in a major thrust against a single objective. Although he was successful in gaining some territory in each region under attack, only in northern Quang Tri Province did these gains have much political or military significance. Had he, on the other hand, concentrated on one main effort, he might have succeeded in occupying more terrain of greater value at less cost.

At the beginning of the offensive, Hanoi rejoiced as NVA forces attacked vigorously across the DMZ, pushed beyond Dong Ha, occupied Quang Tri City and appeared to have a clear access to Hue. If the invading forces immediately following their capture of Quang Tri City could have continued the drive south and southeast with one or two divisions that were being committed in other areas of South Vietnam, Hanoi would certainly have been able to maintain the momentum. Hue City could have fallen to such a concentrated effort and this would have had a major impact throughout South Vietnam. But Hanoi failed to exploit its initial success. By spreading its forces, it lost this capability. Kontum and An Loc might also have been more vulnerable to the enemy if the initial momentum had been sustained. Hanoi was too proud to admit that its forces were anything less than invincible and did not believe that ARVN units would be able to hold in the face of his offensive and its superiority in tanks and artillery.

Apparently, Hanoi also failed to realize in advance that its divergent attacks and timing would enable South Vietnam to commit additional forces into the battles and make up for initial disadvantages. Lack of enemy momentum also contributed to the RVN having enough time to rearrange the deployment of its combat units. The JGS was thus able to assemble the entire Airborne Division, which was then attached piecemeal to Military Region 2 and Military Region 3, move it to northern Military Region 1 and then re-deploy other ARVN units to Kontum and the An Loc area. All redeployments were made in time for the key battles

that decided the fate of these contested areas. So instead of losing one ARVN unit after another as might have happened if the invasion of Quang Tri had been exploited with additional NVA divisions, South Vietnam was able to deploy its divisions into the three fronts, overcoming North Vietnam's initial advantage.

Hanoi's strategic error was further compounded by tactical blunders; two such blunders were most obvious. First, it appeared that all NVA tactical commanders lacked experience in the employment of armor. After overcoming the many problems of introducing tanks into South Vietnam successfully, they failed to use them properly. Instead of making deep thrusts into our lines, creating shock and confusion and disrupting our rear areas, they employed them with hesitancy, primarily in attacks against targets whose armor defenses had been carefully prepared. Our forces learned that some armor vehicles, especially those with external fuel tanks, could be put out of action even by artillery shell fragments.

Captured NVA T-54 Tank Displayed in Saigon, 14 May, 1972

The second most remarkable tactical error derived from their own concept of infantry assaults. Having initial numerical advantage in all of the major areas of contest, they squandered it in suicidal, massive assaults whose attrition rate was so great that replacements could not possibly maintain unit strengths. This was true despite the fact that they usually had a good replacement capability. The continued attrition gradually shifted the balance to our advantage. Several NVA battalions were so badly mauled that they were reduced to less than fifty personnel. During the final stage of the offensive, the deterioration of NVA strength and morale was such that desertion became a serious problem for front line units. Some entire units broke contact hastily and retreated, leaving equipment behind. Such events had rarely happened when we engaged NVA units prior to this time.

The Defense Posture of South Vietnam

North Vietnam thus committed several major strategic and tactical errors during its Easter invasion and these errors contributed to its

eventual failure. However, during the offensive's initial stage, the enemy had the upper hand, advancing from victory to victory on all three fronts. His initial success derived not so much from superior strength or firepower, than from the weaknesses of our defense posture. Not only was South Vietnam's geographical position one of its major vulnerabilities, but the organization and disposition of South Vietnam's defense forces were not adequate for the early containment of an enemy invasion of such proportions.

In spite of their ultimate failure, the fact should be admitted that during the initial stage of the invasion, NVA forces were almost invincible wherever they attacked. They succeeded in occupying Quang Tri in Military Region 1, Dakto in Military Region 2 and Loc Ninh in Military Region 3 with relative rapidity and ARVN defenses crumbled in the face of advancing NVA tanks and infantry. However, the 3d, 22d, and 5th ARVN Divisions were all considered combat ready and had been fully prepared and alerted for major enemy attacks. What caused these early defeats? Looking back on our defense posture at that time, I personally believe that South Vietnam could have done little to prevent these initial setbacks.

In the first place, the geographical configuration of South Vietnam did not lend itself to defense against an invasion. From the DMZ to Cape Ca Mau, South Vietnam was a narrow strip of land averaging approximately one hundred miles in width; at one place, less than 50 miles. But the narrowness would not have been a problem if South Vietnam had been a peninsula surrounded by waters like South Korea. Unfortunately, South Vietnam's western border from the DMZ to Ha Tien City was over 600 miles long. About two thirds of it ran through the jungles and mountains along the Laotian and Cambodian borders, and the southern 200 miles through relatively flat terrain consisting mostly of scrub forests, swamps, and rice farmland. This open border area did not provide the natural features needed for an effective defense. Furthermore, it was especially difficult to defend against an enemy who enjoyed total freedom of movement along the entire frontier. Because of the exposure of this western flank, the enemy was able to infiltrate

and build up his forces with little interruption and attack where and when he wished.

As a result, any determined enemy attack could be driven a considerable distance into South Vietnam's territory before adequate forces could be deployed to contain it. In the face of this vulnerability, South Vietnam was compelled to deploy its forces in a manner as to be able to monitor the entire length of the western border. Our forces were therefore thinly deployed at fire-bases and border camps from the DMZ to the U Minh Forest. Not only could the enemy usually overrun any of the border outposts with a determined attack, but this disposition also immobilized a sizeable force; when enemy attacks materialized in several places at the same time, it was impossible to commit reserves until we could determine where the enemy would make his main effort. South Vietnam was thus forced into a difficult defensive posture which did not offer its forces adequate tactical flexibility and the enemy always enjoyed a definite advantage wherever he chose to attack.

Obviously, South Vietnam became even more difficult to defend when U.S. and Free World Military Assistance (FWMA) forces were withdrawn. Our divisions found themselves overextended almost to the breaking point in order to fill the areas vacated by our departing allies. Because of this over extension, our South Vietnamese divisions lost even more flexibility. In the meantime, NVA forces located in South Vietnam were growing with every passing year. From 149 combat battalions at the end of 1969 when U.S. forces began to re-deploy, NVA forces almost doubled to a total of 285 battalions by the end of 1972. These forces were also becoming more conventional in organization and equipment.

If an analysis were made of the balance of forces and the relationship of capabilities between the warring parties it was evident that over the years, each party had evolved into a sizeable military force. By 1964, the ranks of original Viet Cong insurgents had been depleted to the point that they had to be replenished by North Vietnamese regulars. Then during the period from 1965 to 1972, the enemy strengthened his forces by upgrading guerrilla and local force units into main force units and increased their sizes, not with locally recruited manpower

but with entire regular units infiltrated from North Vietnam. This trend turned insurgents into aggressors and the Communist war effort in South Vietnam increasingly took on the conventional character of overt aggression. Finally, this aggression materialized during the 1972 all out invasion.

During this same period of time the defending forces of South Vietnam, RVN, U.S. and FWMA forces, which initially had a total strength greater than our enemy's, gradually decrease4. The RVN was well aware of its weakening defense posture but there was nothing it could do to strengthen this posture without additional combat forces which meant more equipment, more expenditures. It wanted to activate more divisions, more general reserve forces, but military aid was a limitation. Forced therefore to fill in the vacuum created in Military Region 1 by 80,000 departing U.S. troops, the RVN activated the 3d Division with an initial strength of less than 10,000, formed of existing elements taken here and there from other divisions. The 3d was the only division sized addition to the RVN force structure provided by the Vietnamization program.

Much unduly harsh and unjustified criticism has been directed against the performance of the 3d ARVN Division during the Easter Offensive. The division was new and untested and was deployed to a critical, potentially vulnerable area. But it was never proven that the 3d Division consisted mostly of deserters, pardoned military criminals and other undesirable elements cast off by other units. The 3d ARVN Division was no weakling. It was new only in name, not in combat experience. Five out of its nine organic infantry battalions and its armored cavalry squadron were all units with long combat records, having fought NVA forces in the DMZ area for several years. Its other four infantry battalions were transferred as complete units, not piecemeal, from ARVN and territorial forces of Military Region 1. The great majority of the troops and cadres consisted of local servicemen who were well familiar with the rugged terrain of Military Region 1 and hardened to the cold and wet climate in this part of the country. The division's staff, whose nucleus was the former forward command

element of the 1st ARVN Division at Dong Ha, was well versed with operations and knew the enemy in the DMZ area. In addition, a substantial number of divisional unit commanders were those who had operated in this area, hand in hand with U.S. units and on almost every battlefield, for several years. As such, the 3d Division was anything but a green unit, although it lacked the cohesiveness and efficiency of a division that had fought together as a unit.

What then caused the demise of this division? To put it briefly, the 3d Division failed because it was overburdened. For the defense of the DMZ area, this unit had taken over the combat responsibilities formerly assigned to nearly two U.S. divisions, the reinforced U.S. 3d Marine Division and the 1/5 Brigade (Mechanized). The 3d Division was required to replace these United States units with just four infantry battalions. How could such a defense hold in the face of the strongest, concentrated enemy offensive of the war?

Some observers have suggested that another ARVN division, one that had long been established, could have done better than the 3d Division. I don't think so. I am not sure that replacing it with any other division would have been a wise move or would have changed the results. If a critic was really knowledgeable about ARVN infantry divisions and the way they had been conditioned for so many years to territorial security related tasks, he would have realized that South Vietnam did not have much of a choice. Theoretically of course, any ARVN division was interchangeable with any other and should be able to operate anywhere in South Vietnam. In practice, however, there were only a few units capable of operating effectively in any given area across the country. Most ARVN divisions usually confined their activities and combat operations to a well defined area of responsibility within a military region. Each became accustomed to its area and could not perform with the same effectiveness in another. If emergencies arose, any ARVN division could be employed in mobile operations far removed from its territory, but local security and pacification support requirements always compelled its deployment back to its former area of responsibility after a short time.

The 21st ARVN Division was a case in point. An old horse having ploughed the furrows of the Mekong Delta since it was born, this division was thoroughly at home in its habitat of swamps and canals where it always gave its best performance. It was much less effective in the jungles of Binh Long Province when moved into Military Region 3 to assist in the relief of An Loc. At the beginning of the offensive, there had been a plan to deploy the 21st Division to Military Region 1 as reinforcement for the Quang Tri front. At that time neither the division commander nor any other military authorities believed it would have a chance on such an unfamiliar battleground, especially when the Delta troops had never been exposed to the enemy's heavy artillery.

In addition to the problem of unfamiliarity with the new environment, there was also the complicated and unresolved problem of military dependents. This was a handicap for most ARVN divisions since their troops always grew restless after being separated from their families. If the separation was too long, some would resort to desertion. But it would not do any good to move military dependents to where the men were deployed; they preferred to live near their native towns or villages where they could rely on parents and relatives for help in eking out a living. Very few wanted to be uprooted and transplanted into a strange environment, much less to such areas as Quang Tri Province where the land was so poor that "dogs ate pebbles and chicken fed on salt," and where they would face the constant hazards of enemy shellings and inclement weather.(1)

Looking back on the ordeal of the 3d ARVN Division, I believe that not very many ARVN divisions could have held initially against the concentrated and conventional attacks launched by the enemy. I also believe that no other unit could have done anything better under the complicated command and control system which was established by the I Corps Commander.

At the very least, however, the 3d Division did make two important contributions during the 1972 offensive. It held the Dong Ha line for a month against the overwhelming pressure of superior NVA forces, gaining enough time for Saigon to make necessary preparations for the deployment of general reserve forces to decisive battle areas. And after recovery, which took less than three months, this same division displayed remarkable combat effectiveness battling the NVA 711th Division west of Da Nang during the final stages of the 1972 enemy offensive.

RVNAF Performance

In 1972, although a few U.S. combat units were still in Vietnam, they were all committed to the defense and security of U.S. bases and installations; the RVNAF had assumed the primary responsibility for the ground war. The Americans provided advice, logistics and combat support. When the enemy offensive began, Vietnam's fate was in its own hands. President Thieu, the Joint General Staff and the corps commanders had to decide where, when and how to fight. The test of Vietnamization had come and the United States would share in its outcome.

There was no change in strategy; the concept of securing all national territory continued to be the order of the day. Every area, every strongpoint, no matter how small or remote, had to be held at all cost." The national leadership asserted its firm determination to resist aggression and protect the integrity of South Vietnam's sovereignty; it announced that "we would not yield even a pebble in Quang Tri or a handful of mud in Ca Mau to the enemy"(2). Obviously, this declaration did not take into full account either South Vietnam's defense posture or RVNAF capabilities. A more pragmatic leader would have recognized that the RVNAF simply did not have the resources

to carry out such a policy, at least not without the full support of U.S. and FWMA combat forces as in years past.

The early disaster in I Corps - particularly the decimation of the 3d Division - can be attributed largely to the failure of the corps commander and his staff to provide adequate guidance and support to this front line division. It was the customary practice at I Corps headquarters to shift all tactical responsibility to the divisions, simply by repeating verbatim - perhaps with a few words added - the general mission guidance received from Saigon, such as "Quang Tri must be held at all costs." It did not matter that the division was ill-equipped or too meagerly supported to accomplish such a mission. If Saigon said that a place must be held at all costs, the fact that the corps repeated these instructions to the division was enough to place all responsibility for execution upon the division commander. No one would later question whether the mission was feasible or whether the operation was well supported by the corps. In I Corps, the commander believed that he had done his job when he had said, pointing to a map, "attack there," or "defend here at all costs." When the 3d Division failed, this logic dictated that its commander be tried for its failure, convicted, and sent to prison.

During the initial stage of the offensive, South Vietnamese military authorities reacted just as they had during past periods of increased activity. All deployments and reinforcements were continued in the same piecemeal, fractional manner, a brigade here, a battalion there. The initial efforts were indecisive and not enough to regain the initiative. And when these fragmentary reinforcements accumulated in one area, they created difficult command and control problems with the result that units were not employed with maximum effectiveness.

Quang Tri was an excellent example. It showed that our systems for command and control and our techniques of employment of forces were not adequate to counter the conventional, combined arms tactics being used by the NVA. While NVA forces used artillery to the maximum of its capability, our artillery was seldom placed under centralized control. In almost every case, firing batteries were fragmented into elements and implanted in fixed positions. As a result, the full effect of

massed artillery fire was rarely achieved by an ARVN division. Against massed tank and infantry formations, our dispersed artillery was unable to concentrate enough destructive fire to disrupt them. This not only happened at Quang Tri during the initial battles but, unfortunately, persisted to a somewhat lesser degree throughout the offensive. Commanders failed to coordinate properly all of the usually abundant fires that were available at division level. There included U.S. naval gunfire and tactical air, and Vietnamese tactical air and artillery.

After the initial setbacks, however, the national leadership undertook to remedy some of these errors and shortcomings, to include the replacement of certain key commanders in the field. Consequently, the employment of combat and combat support units in combined arms operations improved significantly. Procedures for the coordinated use of air, naval gunfire and artillery were also developed. The result was that ARVN units, which consisted of courageous and resilient soldiers, were eventually able to stand firm and defeat NVA attacks.

Public Dislay of NVA Weapons Captured During 1972 Easter Offensive

When the enemy launched his Nguyen Hue offensive, I am certain that he expected to quickly seize some of his major objectives. However, he was unsuccessful. An Loc held firm; so did Kontum, and Quang Tri was eventually retaken. Obviously, he did not believe that the RVNAF could recover so quickly after initial reverses. This capability became characteristic of RVNAF maturity and combat effectiveness. The enemy also learned that the RVNAF, with adequate U.S. support, was capable of resisting the best efforts of North Vietnamese Army.

At An Loc the superhuman endurance and resourcefulness of ARVN troops helped reverse the trend of several battles and the decisive B-52 strikes finally broke the enemy siege. Although this was definitely a victory for the RVNAF, a victory achieved at high cost in men and equipment, the III Corps counteroffensive stalled at the end of the year, with the enemy still in control of most of the areas he had occupied during the initial stage of the offensive. The RVNAF simply lacked the capability to mass the force required to open Route 13 past Chon Thanh or past An Loc into Loc Ninh.

In Kontum, the enemy fought desperate battles with apparent disregard for casualties; he lost over 4,000 men there. He had succeeded in capturing part of the city but could not hold it beyond mid June when the 23d ARVN Division regained control. II Corps' painful effort to clear Route QL-14 from Pleiku to Kontum terminated in early July when this road w~s reopened to commercial traffic, although enemy interdictions continued periodically until year's end. ARVN operations conducted north of Kontum to regain control of the lost territory were not as successful. Until cease- fire day, the enemy was still in control of the area north of the city, from Vo Dinh to Dak Pek. As in Military Region III, the forces that would be needed to carry a counter offensive north into strongly defended enemy' bases were not available.

The RVNAF counteroffensive in Military Region 1 was by far the most vigorous effort to retake lost territory and was partially successful. Quang Tri City was recaptured but only after 80 long days of bloody fighting. By the time the marines regained control of the old citadel in mid September, the city was smoldering ruins. At year's end, the RVNAF marines pushed north along the coast until they reached the Thach Han River's estuary. I Corps's farthest offensive spearhead to the west, meanwhile, terminated when ARVN paratroopers retook FSB Anne. The defense of Hue City also became more consolidated as the 1st ARVN Division successfully pushed westward to the vicinity of FSB Veghel. But we were unable to restore the old frontier along the DMZ.

U.S. Support

One of the major factors contributing to the RVNAF success in stalling and eventually defeating the enemy's Easter Offensive was United States support. Never before had the American response to the NVA threat been so forceful and determined. Among other things, the United States substantially increased its air and naval fire support and provided South Vietnam with as much equipment and supplies as was required. Furthermore, this support was coordinated with an increased ...

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... advisers were withdrawn as soon as the RVNAF regained the initiative.) As a result, advisers found themselves once again participating in daily combat operations during the Easter Offensive, working hand in hand with ARVN counterparts and sharing in their success or failure.

Despite the American policy which dictated that advisers were to remain with their units regardless of enemy pressure the regional senior advisers was empowered to extricate them from immediate dangers. There were a few instances during the offensive when advisers had to leave their units. Most of them, however, welcomed the challenge of staying with their counterparts until the very last minute to provide moral support and coordinate the employment of tactical air and gun-ships for their embattled units.

At the corps and division levels, advisers played a most significant role. They assisted corps and division staffs in planning and supervising combat operations and developing procedures for the effective use and coordination of tactical air, naval gunfire and artillery. These were the areas in which ARNV commanders and their staffs most required assistance. The regional assistance commands, therefore, proved to be timely and most responsive institutions that greatly assisted the ARVN Corps during the 1972 Easter Offensive.

(2) President Thieu's statement, reiterated many times during his 1972 visits to MR-l.)